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The splashy attention and criticism of neuroeconomics is a referendum on 
how curious economists are about how 
the brain makes economic decisions and 
whether new insights can tweak old models 
or inspire new ones.
At one extreme is aggressive disinterest in 
brain activity. This disinterest is motivated by 
the methodological history and  convention 
of economists working extra hard, and inge-
niously, to infer unobservables—such as 
beliefs, utilities, thinking costs, and more—
from observable choices. Other scientific dis-
ciplines take an easier route by simply trying 
to measure the unobservables directly as best 
they can, as well as inferring unobservables 
statistically.
At the other extreme is a conviction that 
progress will certainly be made in under-
standing the biological basis of economic 
choice, that such progress will inform “stan-
dard” economic concerns (such as predict-
ing choice responses to policy variables), 
that progress is certainly facilitated by direct 
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 collaboration and by shared scientific literacy 
between economists and neuroscientists, 
and that this is an historically good time to 
start that collaboration.
The extremely skeptical approach fore-
casts the time at which neural data is useful 
as “never.” The progressive approach says 
the time is “someday.” Which do you think is 
likely to prove correct in your lifetime?
This review essay is about the motives, 
methods, and tentative early findings in neu-
roeconomics, and where they are between 
the two extremes. The review part is moti-
vated by the 2011 book Foundations of 
Neuroeconomic Analysis, by Paul Glimcher. 
The title is apparently a (perilous?) hom-
age to Paul Samuelson’s monumental 
Foundations of Economic Analysis. 
Glimcher’s book presents a helpfully clear 
vision of one part of the progressive approach 
to neuroeconomics. The titled “foundation” 
that dominates the book is a simple value-
and-compare model in which neural circuits 
compute random utility for choice objects, 
then compare them and pick the best one. 
Glimcher argues that there is actually a 
natural correspondence between elements 
of these neural mechanisms and “as if” con-
structs in standard theory (i.e., utilities and 
maximization). 
The book is not intended to be either an 
overall, balanced introduction to a rapidly-
growing field, nor a comprehensive textbook. 
So this essay will first present a broader 
vision about all the building blocks of neu-
roeconomics, filling in what readers might 
want to know about the many other develop-
ments in neuroeconomics that are not cov-
ered in the book. Then I will comment, as 
a book critic, on what is both admirable and 
imperfect about Glimcher’s book. 
2. Goals and Methods of Neuroeconomics
The main goal of neuroeconomics is to 
supply a mechanistic account of how eco-
nomic choices are made. As Glimcher and 
Rustichini (2004) nicely put it, the goal is 
a theory that is mechanistic, mathematical, 
and behavioral. Traditional economic mod-
els are both mathematical and behavioral. 
Typical neuroscience models are mechanis-
tic and behavioral, but rarely mathemati-
cal. The shared goal of neuroeconomists, 
whether from neuroscience or economics, is 
to have models with all three properties.
Some neuroeconomists are interested in 
the mechanistic details for their own sake, 
or for practical purposes, such as associating 
computational mistakes with mental health 
disorders (e.g., Kishida, King-Casas, and 
Montague 2010). Others, like myself, hope 
that understanding the neural mechanisms 
will actually improve our ability to under-
stand choice in order to better accomplish 
traditional goals in economics—predicting 
choices, predicting responses to changes in 
prices and other variables, designing insti-
tutions that are robust to imperfections 
in neural implementation, and perhaps in 
understanding more about welfare. 
Please note that all economists who are 
interested in neuroscience are perfectly 
aware that the study of brain activity during 
choice is a radical departure from current 
standard economic practice. The agnostic 
disinterest in mechanistic details is very obvi-
ously a traditional part of modern revealed 
preference theory (although not of earlier 
economic thought).1
The key step for seeing whether neu-
roscience can contribute to economics is 
distinguishing particular methodological 
approaches in economics from the general 
1 It is also noteworthy that many earlier economists 
including Edgeworth, Fisher, and Ramsey were keenly 
interested in, and wrote fantastically, about “hedonim-
eters” and other then-fictional devices for linking biology 
and choice (Colander 2007). Thus, the modernized recon-
struction that “economists were never interested in flesh-
and-blood human beings” (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008) is 
wrong (unless Edgeworth et al. are retroactively disbarred 
from the category “economists” for their speculations).
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goal of understanding what causes choice. 
The proper definition of the scope of eco-
nomics is a broad one: our goal is to under-
stand the causes of choices and their welfare 
implications. Aggregation across individuals 
and institutions such as firms and govern-
ments play a special role because those 
forces produce choice sets, prices, informa-
tion, and special kinds of constraints (e.g., 
law). 
One way to study the choice process is 
to assume that unobserved preferences are 
stable and revealed well by observed past 
choices. However, there is nothing about the 
broader desire to understand and predict 
choices that prohibits other attempts to mea-
sure what causes choices by using nonchoice 
data. That is, inference only from revealed 
preference is one way to learn about the 
causes of choices and welfare, but it is not the 
only way. Other ways are certainly conceiv-
able, and might be better in some respects 
(e.g., Bernheim 2009). 
Importantly, Glimcher correctly notes 
that linking economics and neuroscience 
first requires “natural kinds” that are under-
stood in their disciplines. Linking them then 
requires scientists who understand both 
natural kinds and agree on some of the ways 
in which the two kinds are related (though 
the empirical details of the relation are likely 
to be under constant debate and revision). 
Glimcher proposes the term “subjective 
value” for a neural “kind” and utility—more 
aptly, decision utility—for the associated 
economic kind. This view has been implicit 
in neuroeconomics from the beginning, but 
Glimcher’s persuasive writing creates useful 
clarity here. 
In my view, Glimcher portrays the most 
traditional economic theorists as more flex-
ible than their writing suggests. He says 
that Gul and Pesendorfer “argue, [that] 
economic and neuroscientific analyses are 
independent and must remain indepen-
dent as long as the body of economic theory 
 contains no biological concepts of any kind” 
(Gul and Pesendorfer 2008).  
A class of examples that refute the claim 
of independence of economics and neuro-
science is the prediction of actual choices 
from direct recording of neural activity. 
This kind of prediction is useful when past 
choice data are not likely to predict future 
choices well. Examples include new prod-
ucts, responses to policy changes that are 
historically unprecedented (e.g., labor 
markets upon integration of East and West 
Germany), or when omitted variables in 
measures of past choices bias estimates. In 
these cases, a revealed-preference approach 
based on inference from past data is subject 
to a variant of the Lucas critique (see Dean 
2013).
Some studies have already shown that 
neural measures during passive viewing of 
choice objects can predict, to some extent, 
what choices are later made (see Levy et al. 
2010; Smith et al. forthcoming). Neural 
subjective value reactions to antismoking 
ads predict whether smokers quit and which 
televised ads draw the most calls to a help 
hotline (Falk, Berkman, and Lieberman 
2012; Falk et al. 2011). In fact, neural reac-
tions to the ads from a small brain-imaged 
sample predicted actual hotline calls (by 
thousands of callers who see the ads on 
TV) better than subjects’ self-reports of ad 
effectiveness did. What artificial TV-series 
ideas people choose to forward to others 
(a measure of “virality”) are predicted by 
activity in mentalizing and reward areas 
(Falk et al. 2013). These examples suggest 
the possibility that standard forecasting of 
future behavior from past choice can be 
improved if omitted variables (neural mea-
sures) are included. 
3. What Neuroeconomics Can Do
 Improved understanding of the link 
between neural mechanisms and choices is 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LI (December 2013)1158
likely to lead to three types of support and 
inspiration for areas of economic theory: 
• Neural evidence of utility maximization 
in simple choice; 
• Neural evidence distinguishing different 
behavioral and rational processes;
• Neural evidence of other psychological 
influences.
Glimcher’s book concentrates on the first 
kind of evidence. However, the other two 
types of evidence are likely to grow more 
rapidly in the years ahead. Therefore, I will 
describe some of that evidence next.
3.1  Neural Evidence of Utility 
Maximization in Simple Choice
The first general contribution of neuro-
economics will be isolating the neural cir-
cuitry of simple choices. In simple cases, this 
circuitry is likely to produce stable neural 
measures that correspond to some form of 
utility maximization. That is, it will not be 
inaccurate to say that the brain is “comput-
ing” utilities (which reliably predict actual 
choices), much as the visuomotor system 
of a furniture mover “computes” the likely 
weight of a chair in order to prepare muscles 
for lifting.  
Glimcher’s book is much focused on this 
first contribution, except for extensive dis-
cussion of normalization and relatively 
brief discussions of challenges to utility 
maximization.
Note, however, that the decision computa-
tions that are likely to fall in this category will 
be simple: in experiments, they are typically 
binary choices between two costless rewards 
that differ on one quality dimension (e.g., 
amount of juice or taste), which are repeated 
many times so that the experienced reward 
value is learned. 
Many studies strongly indicate that neural 
measures of reward value, such as firing rates 
or blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) 
blood flow, correspond to values inferred 
from choice. Human fMRI and other evi-
dence also indicate that this result extends 
to somewhat more complicated choices 
(such as food choices and charitable giv-
ing). However, nothing is yet known about 
whether the same types of neural activ-
ity compute subjective values for goods or 
activities that are substantially more complex 
(health care plans, mates, jobs). And impor-
tantly, there is little research on how the 
neural system accounts for prices or income, 
time, and attention constraints in the choices 
made in everyday shopping. 
Suppose that the value-and-compare 
model generates subjective values that 
match up with inferred utilities in simple 
cases but not in all cases. What other mecha-
nisms might be at work and how would they 
fit into economics? 
Decades of research with different meth-
ods and species suggest there are several 
neurally distinct sources of subjective valu-
ation or choice. They are sketched in table 1 
(see, Rangel, Camerer, and Montague 2008 
and references therein for details). 
A simple system of some kind exhibits 
prepared or innate preferences. This system 
responds to “primary reinforcers,” which are 
goods like food, liquids, warmth, and physi-
cal contact that neonate infants “prefer” at 
birth. A striking example is the preference 
for looking at faces. Newborns as young as 
several minutes old prefer to look longer at 
face caricatures than at visually-comparable 
scrambled faces, and they stare longer when 
the faces make eye contact and are lit from 
above (as if the face is above them) (Valenza 
et al. 1996; Farroni et al. 2002, 2005). Such 
innate preferences are likely to be cultur-
ally universal, and avoiding choices based on 
these preferences would be effortful. 
The second, “learned” value system is 
the major topic of Glimcher’s book. It is 
probably the one about which the most is 
known, partly because it seems to be shared 
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 anatomically and functionally across species. 
This system uses reinforcement learning 
rules (which are well specified mathemati-
cally) guided by prediction error to learn 
subjective values. After sufficient learning 
takes place, the learned subjective values 
are likely to be the closest neural computa-
tion that we would call, in economic terms, a 
stable preference for a good. 
This learning system is goal-directed: “it 
depends on a representation of the action-
outcome contingency (that lever pressing 
produces food: the cognitive map) and on the 
outcome as a desired goal or incentive (that 
food is valuable)” (Berridge and O’Doherty 
2014, p. 396).
That is, goal-directed valuation attaches 
value to actions, which are thought (in a 
sense of mental representation) to achieve 
goals. Goal-directed valuation is more flex-
ible because it can learn to shift when a val-
ued action is devalued, and will shift to a 
different action that leads to the valued out-
come if the action–outcome contingency is 
represented. 
A special kind of goal-directed valuation is 
called “model-based.” In this case, informa-
tion about consequences of an action can be 
computed from a “model” or representation, 
even if the action has not been chosen and the 
consequences have not been experienced. 
This type of valuation is obviously crucial in 
many complex novel choices humans face. 
When a new Ph.D. is choosing TIAA–CREF 
plans on their first job, for example, they 
have no history of experience making similar 
choices that has enabled learning of values. 
A third system is called “habitual.” It 
associates stimuli to responses (a canonical 
example is human motor action, as in learn-
ing to play a sport). Habits, by definition, do 
not respond rapidly to changes in the value 
of outcomes that result from responses. A 
habit is “outcome-insensitive so that it will 
persist even after an outcome is no longer 
valued” (Tricomi, Balleine, and O’Doherty 
2009). If one could identify when a human 
choice response was being implemented by 
the habit system, one could reliably predict 
that the short-run elasticity of a habitual 
response to changes in state variables (out-
comes, prices, information) would be low. An 
everyday example is “outcome-inappropriate 
cue-driven behavior (e.g., stepping out of an 
elevator when the doors open, although it 
has stopped on the wrong floor)” (Tricomi, 
Balleine, and O’Doherty 2009, p. 2229). A 
more dramatic canonical example is highly 
addicted drug users, who overdose when 
drug purity changes because their dosing 
TABLE 1 
Hypothesized Economic Effects of Different Neural Choice Systems 
Neural choice system Features Interesting economic effects
Prepared (innate) Primary reinforcers, faces, imitative “Hard-wired”, universal
Habit Overlearned, low effort, 
stimulus⇾response
Low elasticities in response to outcome 
change
Conditioned learning Learning u(subjective value) over time; 
goal-directed
 Preference changes over time
Model-based Goal-directed valuation based on  
representation; conflicted, “constructed” 
preferences
Self-control, framing effects
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choice is habitual and does not respond to 
purity change. 
Many of the choices that are considered 
difficult arise when there is conflict between 
choices recommended by different value 
systems. When Bill Clinton was deciding 
whether to have sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky, a goal-directed system mindful of 
the chance of being caught and suffering 
impeachment with highly-evolved prepared 
(and learned, in Bill’s case) valuation of sex. 
Score: Legacy 0, Sex 1. 
3.1.1 Major Unmet Challenges
Going beyond the simple settings in which 
conditioned learning leads to stable prefer-
ences presents at least two challenges. First, 
the basic experiments have no prices or 
income. Monkeys and people choose among 
“free” goods or, in some studies, bid for sin-
gle goods with foregone juice rewards (Platt 
and Glimcher 1999) or with money. As noted 
earlier, however, the learning system is ideal 
for learning valuation but not for trading off 
different goals (getting the most reward, and 
spending the least), which is required for 
responding to changes in prices and income 
constraint. 
It is easy to choose consistently between 
two juices or foods. Measured efficiency 
losses from inconsistent (nonmaximizing) 
choices between two-good bundles are never 
higher than a few percent, even for people 
with VMPFC damage (Camille et al. 2011).
However, there are many sources of 
complexity in naturally-occurring human 
choices of much interest to economics. 
Complexity comes from temptation, risk, 
hidden quality, multiple attributes, future 
timing, unfamiliarity necessitating goal-
directed construction of value, and com-
petition between prepared, learned, and 
goal-directed systems. Under these condi-
tions, utility maximization is less plausible 
(especially when the description of goods 
can affect perceived value). 
Furthermore, even going from two to 
three (or a few) choices complicates the 
process quite a bit. Working memory could 
become a constraint on retrieving cached val-
ues to compare. The presence of low-quality 
unchosen objects is also thought to affect val-
ues of other objects, in violation of the prin-
ciple that objects have menu-independent 
values (Tversky and Simonson 1993). And if 
the objects have different features that are 
not integrated into a single object value, then 
the implicit “agenda” in which one object 
is compared against the set of two others 
(Tversky and Sattath 1979) can affect choice, 
as has been known for decades. 
It would be sad if the two-stage back 
pocket model only works for highly-learned 
choices among two free goods. As noted ear-
lier, when a habit system makes choices it is 
unlikely, by definition, that many choices are 
all separately valued then compared (e.g., 
the nonhabitual choice will be ignored or 
underprocessed). And when a goal-directed 
system selects choices that contribute to dif-
ferent goals—or the basic systems compete 
in evaluating them, such as sexual temptation 
competing with avoiding a harassment law-
suit—many models other than the two-stage 
value-and-compare are likely to operate. 
Indeed, there is ample evidence that this is 
so, which is briefly addressed in chapter 15. 
3.2  Neural Evidence Distinguishing 
Different Behavioral and Rational 
Processes
The second general contribution of neuro-
economics is evidence about whether behav-
ioral economics computations are made by 
the brain. On this count, the coverage in 
Glimcher’s new book is already well behind 
the curve, but for a deliberate reason. He 
says, “[J]ust as neoclassical theory defined 
the starting point from which behavioral eco-
nomics begins its explanation, neoclassically 
anchored models must serve as the start-
ing point from which neuroeconomics will 
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develop as a broadly interdisciplinary field” 
(p. 389).
I disagree. Neuroclassical models are one 
starting point for neuroeconomics (a conser-
vative start). However, given rapid progress 
in behavioral economics, there is no reason 
to privilege the neoclassical view as a start-
ing point. One could equally well move 
right away to a search for a general theory 
of neural choice architecture, expecting 
to see limiting conditions in which rational 
choice restrictions hold. Glimcher’s ratio-
nale for the conservative approach is: “[W]e 
have just begun to explore the strengths of 
our neural architecture for choice and valu-
ation. Understanding the weaknesses of that 
same system will doubtless follow, although 
that understanding today is in its infancy” 
(p. 389). 
Glimcher may simply not be aware how 
much we already understand behaviorally 
about the “weaknesses of that same sys-
tem”—that is, the limits that psychologists 
and behavioral economists have been docu-
menting using lab and field choice data since 
the 1970s. Given this knowledge, accompa-
nying neuroscientific evidence could prog-
ress very rapidly, and actually is progressing. 
This section will briefly describe progress 
in just two directions (prospect theory and 
time preference), then mention findings on 
other behavioral economics topics.
3.2.1 Prospect Theory 
The key elements of prospect theory are 
reference-dependence of outcome evalua-
tion, loss-aversion, and nonlinear weighting 
of probabilities. 
Loss-aversion: Tom et al. (2007) found 
that across subjects, the difference in brain 
response to potential loss dollar for dollar, 
relative to potential gain (“neural loss aver-
sion”) was correlated with the degree of loss 
aversion inferred behaviorally from choices 
among gambles. (We call this type of correla-
tion “neurometric”). Yacubian et al. (2006), 
found special gain activity in VStr, and special 
loss activity in amygdala and temporal lobe 
regions. De Martino, Camerer, and Adolphs 
(2010) found that two patients with selec-
tive bilateral amygdala lesions exhibited no 
loss aversion. De Martino et al. (2006) also 
found that amygdala activity was associated 
with common choices that reflect framing 
effects. Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, and Phelps 
(2013) found that emotionally regulating the 
reaction to financial loss reduced amygdala 
activity. All these studies indicate an interest-
ing role for emotion in loss aversion. The fact 
that monkeys seem to exhibit loss-aversion 
also indicates that it has a phyologenetically 
“old” origin that is not unique to humans 
(Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and Santos 2006; 
Lakshminarayanan, Chen, and Santos 2008).
Nonlinear weighting of probabilities: Hsu 
et al. (2009) reported evidence that nonlin-
early weighted probabilities of valued out-
comes are encoded in the striatum. This 
finding suggests that such weights reflect 
genuine preference, rather than, say, a mis-
take in perceiving probabilities (unless the 
mistake underlies preference). 
3.2.2 Time Preference 
The neural architecture of expressed 
time preference is an area in which neuro-
science is likely to have a large impact. For 
example, it is clear that patience in different 
species, and in the human developmental 
lifecycle, are associated with brain structure 
and development (e.g., Rosati et al. 2007). 
Working memory is also associated with 
patience, which suggests an important role 
for “keeping the future in mind” to make 
patient choices.
The first wave of neuroeconomic stud-
ies focused on whether temporal choices 
depend on two systems, which separately 
value a present reward (a bird in the hand) 
and a future imagined reward (two [birds] 
in the bush). One useful two-system 
model is the β-δ model of quasi-hyperbolic 
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discounting (Laibson 1997). Valuation of a 
consumption stream at time can be written as, 
V(t) =  (  1 _ β − 1 )  u(ct) +  ∑ τ =0∞ δ τ u(ct+τ), a 
decomposition into a hypervalued initial 
reward u(ct) (“inflated” by present bias if β < 1) and a conventional exponentially-dis-
counted stream of initial and future utilities. 
If β = 1 the first term disappears. 
McClure et al. (2004, 2007) present evi-
dence from choices between money and 
juice suggesting a β “meso-limbic dopami-
nergic” system (striatum and medial orbi-
tofrontal cortex (MOFC)) and a patient δ 
system includes dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (DLPFC) and parietal cortex. 
Using a different design with a fixed “pres-
ent” reward, Kable and Glimcher (2007) fit 
a unified-value hyperbolic discount func-
tion u(ct)/(1 + kt) to brain activity. They 
conclude that there is only a single system 
(encoding u(ct)/(1 + kt)) since regions 
McClure et al. labeled β regions were active 
when the delayed reward changed. 
Kable and Glimcher (2007) vocally argue 
for the one-system view. However, other 
kinds of evidence are consistent with some 
kind of competition between two (or more) 
types of valuation. For example, Luo et al. 
(2009) find residual activity in valuation 
areas for immediate rewards, even control-
ling for value (as revealed by preference). 
Sellitto, Ciaramelli, and di Pellegrino (2010) 
showed that patients with MPFC damage 
are more impatient than matched neurotypi-
cal patients.
A different paradigm investigates self-
control during choices that are all immedi-
ate. Hare, Camerer, and Rangel (2009) had 
subjects choose between foods like yogurt 
and candy bars, which vary in health (long-
run benefit) and taste (short-run benefit). 
DLPFC activity is associated with success-
ful self-control—avoiding tasty unhealthy 
snacks—by indirectly controlling value 
encoded in MOFC. A later study disrupting 
DLPFC activity—a “temporary lesion”—
found that such disruption made people 
more impatient (Figner et al. 2010), as if 
DLPFC enforces self-control, and disrupt-
ing us leads to lapses (and also consistently 
with McClure et al. 2004, 2007). 
These few studies and new ones that 
are accumulating rapidly, suggest a view 
in which expressed preference for future 
rewards is determined by neural activ-
ity associated with cognitive control (in 
DLPFC) and thinking about future (see 
Peters and Büchel 2010; Carter, Meyer, 
and Huettel 2010). This hypothesis should 
not be shocking to economists, since it has 
often been proposed in the form of mul-
tiple-self “planner–doer” models (Thaler 
and Shefrin 1981; Fudenberg and Levine 
2006). However, filling in the neural detail 
will lead to new comparative static predic-
tions about what mental state variables or 
exogeneous events change expressed time 
preference. 
For example, Hershfield et al. (2011) found 
evidence that people were more patient 
when they interacted with aged versions of 
their “future selves” using facial-morphing 
software. It is also well known that prefrontal 
circuitry, including DLPFC, develops more 
slowly than reward and affective circuitry in 
adolescence (Casey, Getz, and Galvan 2008). 
Given evidence of the role of DLPFC in 
future valuation and self-control immedi-
ately suggests why adolescents are behav-
iorally impulsive. This is important because 
many adolescent decisions have long-run 
consequences (teen pregnancy, schooling 
choice, smoking, and drug use). 
3.2.3 Other Behavioral Economics Topics
Social preferences: Behavioral economics 
has made substantial progress in replacing a 
simple placeholder of self-interested pref-
erence with richer models of social pref-
erence for equality, reciprocity, and social 
image. There is now ample data about how 
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hormones, genetics, and brain activity dur-
ing social choice are associated with social 
preference (e.g., Fehr and Camerer 2007; 
Tricomi, Balleine, and O’Doherty 2009; 
Rilling and Sanfey 2011). The data over-
whelmingly support the view that expressed 
social preferences are based on internal 
valuations that are traded off with value for 
one’s own payoffs. So far, there is evidence 
consistent with different types of valuation, 
including warm glow (Harbaugh, Mayr, 
and Burghart 2007), inequality aversion 
(Tricomi, Balleine, and O’Doherty 2009), 
and social image (Izuma et al. 2011; Izuma, 
Saito, and Sadato 2010). 
Strategic thinking: Mentalizing or “the-
ory of mind” is the capacity, either unique 
to humans or most reliably developed in us, 
to imagine what another organism believes, 
wants, or intends. Obviously such a capac-
ity is presumed by most analyses in game 
theory. 
Studies are beginning to clearly indicate 
a link between theory of mind regions and 
game-theoretic computations (see Hampton, 
Bossaerts, and O’Doherty 2008; Coricelli 
and Nagel 2009; Camerer and Smith 2012). 
The data also suggest individual differences 
that are consistent with a cognitive hierar-
chy or level-k approach to iterated reasoning 
(Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004; Crawford, 
Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri 2011). 
For example, Bhatt et al. (2010, forth-
coming) studied a bargaining game with 
one-sided private information. A buyer 
observed her hidden value, then stated a 
(cheaptalk) suggested price to a seller. The 
seller inferred whatever she could about 
the hidden value from the suggestion, then 
stated a take-it-or-leave-it price. Bhatt 
et al. (2010) found that when buyers were 
extremely deceptive (level-2), they had 
more activity in DLPFC and in the tem-
poral-parietal junction (TPJ). Sellers who 
offered prices that reflected suspicion about 
whether buyers revealed information about 
the hidden value had higher activity in 
amygdala. These findings link computations 
made in behavioral game theory to brain 
regions involved in mentalizing “threat” or 
social fear (amygdala). 
Keep in mind that traditional equilibrium 
analyses say nothing at all about individual 
differences. Cognitive hierarchy and level-k 
approaches are one way to do so, and neural 
activity will help distinguish “good” (high-
performance) players from weak players. 
Tentative neuroeconomics data are also 
generally consistent with behavioral econom-
ics hypotheses in other domains, including:
• Crowding out of intrinsic incentives 
(Murayama et al. 2010);
• Negative performance response to very 
high incentives (“choking”) (Chib et al. 
2012); 
• Overlap in activity during hypothetical 
and real choice (consistent with overre-
porting purchase intentions hypotheti-
cally), and more activity in real choices in 
in value-computing areas, for consumer 
goods (Kang et al. 2011), and in insula 
and amygdala for “bads” (eating unpleas-
ant foods) (Kang and Camerer 2013);
• Reduced value-related activity when 
choice sets are larger than ideal due to 
information processing (“choice over-
load”) (Reutskaja et al. 2011); 
• Evidence for computation of “foregone 
payoffs” or fictive learning in decisions 
and games, as in EWA learning in games 
(Camerer and Ho 1999) (see Thevarajah 
et al., 2009; Zhu, Mathewson, and Hsu 
2012); 
• Evidence that stock market bubbles 
are associated with enhanced mentaliz-
ing contributes to stock market bubbles 
(DeMartino et al. 2013) and with het-
erogeneous trader response to nucleus 
accumbens signals and to insula “early 
warning” signals of impending crashes 
(Smith et al. 2013).
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3.3  Neural Evidence of Other Psychological 
Processes
The most novel contribution of neuro-
economics to economics, per se, may come 
from supplying evidence about other kinds 
of complex psychological processes that have 
been understudied in behavioral economics. 
In these cases, their complexity makes the 
axiomatic approach and “as if” testing espe-
cially challenging, and possibly inefficient, 
compared to supplementing theorizing and 
analysis of field data with information about 
mechanisms. Here are two loosely sketched 
examples: addiction and emotion. 
Addiction: This is a topic in which both 
simple extensions of rational choice mod-
eling and biological details have proved 
insightful. Becker and Murphy’s (1988) 
famous approach boils addiction down to 
adjacent complementarities between current 
consumption and a “habit stock” based on 
past consumption. Their model allows some 
breathing room for investments to adjust the 
habit stock, such as deliberate time in rehab, 
and also allows shocks such as stressful 
events (divorce, unemployment) that could 
trigger “self-medicating” substance use. A 
richer model based on consumption states is 
Bernheim and Rangel (2004).
On another front, the neurobiology and 
clinical evidence indicates several interesting 
facts about the underlying mechanisms of 
addiction. Rats become biologically addicted, 
exhibiting tolerance and withdrawal, to all 
substances humans do, which implicates 
a common source in homologous rat and 
human brain areas. Many users exhibit poly-
drug use, substituting between drugs (per-
haps very rationally in the sense of exhibiting 
high cross-price elasticity and sensitivity to 
full price effects like shifts in policing prior-
ity). A remarkable finding is that drug use 
habituates users to create homeostatic “feed-
forward” adaptation to environmental cues 
(like the time and place of habitual use). In 
plainer terms, suppose you regularly inject 
heroin with K.R. on Avenue C after 2 a.m. 
bar closing. Then seeing K.R., walking past 
Avenue C, or noticing that people are leaving 
bars that just closed could induce craving for 
the drug, as the body adjusts homeostatically 
for the expectation of imminent drug use. 
Laibson (2001) extends the rational choice 
model to include such cues.
Emotion: Thorough modeling of emotions 
has proved elusive in economics (though see 
Loewenstein 2000; Romer 2000; Loewenstein 
and O’Donoghue 2007). Some useful exam-
ples treat a particular emotion as a source 
of disutility and look for evidence of a nega-
tive emotion manifested in choice data (e.g., 
Costa and Kahn 2007). In psychological game 
theory (Dufwenberg 2008) and evolution-
ary psychology social emotions are thought 
to functionally signal surprises relative to 
expectations, and convey an expectation of 
future action. For example Sell, Tooby, and 
Cosmides (2009) define  as an expression of 
disappointment in getting less from another 
person’s action than was expected, which both 
invites an apology and threatens revenge.
Emotion is absent from Glimcher’s book, 
and indeed, is also absent from much of 
decision neuroscience. An economics-
friendly view is that an emotion is a rapidly-
processed reaction to good or bad news, felt 
by the body and expressed both externally 
(e.g., by facial expression, so other people 
can see) and internally (by the nervous sys-
tem and brain circuitry). Adolphs described 
the modern view this way: “. . . emotions are 
triggered by events of some significance or 
relevance to an organism, that they encom-
pass a coordinated set of changes in brain 
and body, and that they appear adaptive in 
the sense that they are directed towards cop-
ing with whatever challenge was posed by 
the triggering event” (2010).
In my view, economics should simply 
define an emotion as a distinct primitive con-
cept that can have characteristics of  utilities, 
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 information, or constraint. For example, 
fear feels unpleasant (people usually spend 
resources to avoid it), conveys noisy informa-
tion about impending threat, and can reduce 
cognitive control and physical action (as in 
“paralyzed with fear”). 
Note also that there is no sharp divide 
between emotion and cognition; they are like 
Siamese twins. Top–down cognitive “reap-
praisal” influences emotions, and emotions 
influence information processing. 
Incorporating emotion into economics is 
likely to be substantially aided by affective 
neuroscience. The neuroscience provides 
multiple biological measures of emotions, 
which are especially useful because any one 
measure—such as skin conductance—usu-
ally does not measure both the intensity of 
the emotion (arousal) and its “sign” (positive 
or negative “valence”). 
An example is two studies by Sokol-
Hessner et al. (2009) and Sokol-Hessner, 
Camerer, and Phelps (2013) on “emotional 
regulation” (also called “reappraisal”) dur-
ing risky choice. Their subjects made a series 
of choices between certain amounts and 
50/50 gain–loss gambles (designed to esti-
mate individual parameters of risk-aversion, 
 loss-aversion, and response noise). They 
were trained to turn on and off a “cognitive 
re-appraisal,” in blocks of 10 trials, which is 
intended to reduce negative emotion when 
taking a risk. 
When subjects are “regulating” their nega-
tive emotions, their estimated loss-aversion 
is lower, and their skin conductance response 
to actually losing (when they do choose a 
gamble) is lower (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009). 
Regulating subjects are changing revealed 
preferences by changing their emotions. 
fMRI analysis showed that DLPFC was 
active during regulation. Subjects who could 
regulate their loss response (as inferred from 
behavioral loss-aversion) showed reduced 
activity in the amygdala during loss (and no 
difference in gain).  
How could we describe emotional regu-
lation in economic terms? People have the 
capacity to imagine how they would feel and 
behave in different mental states (includ-
ing emotional ones). Attention to the simu-
lated state crowds out attention to the true 
state, which changes behavior and biological 
expression of emotion. 
In fact, this sort of imagination is used rou-
tinely in life and in economics. One approach 
to acting is to imagine previous experiences 
that produce the emotion that is desired. For 
example, if you imagine how you would feel 
if your child died, you might feel genuine 
sadness. This doesn’t mean that you “think” 
your child is dead; it just means you have the 
capacity to do counterfactual reasoning, and 
that reasoning can produce powerful emo-
tions and can change behavior.
In economics, the ability to imagine what 
you might do in another state is essentially 
assumed in game theory when there are 
information asymmetries (e.g., a bidder 
must imagine what a bidder with a different 
value than their own will do, in an auction, 
unless he or she learned an equilibrium bid-
ding function over time). So in economic 
language, we could translate the psycho-
logical concept of emotional regulation 
into “the use of scarce cognitive resources 
to self-create alternative states.” Or we can 
just learn some new vocabulary—regula-
tion, or reappraisal. 
Social networks: A small literature is 
emerging showing a remarkable link between 
the extent of social networks, both across and 
within species. This is interesting as forming 
network links is a socio-economic choice, and 
networks are also institutions which can pass 
information and affect preference. The earli-
est finding is that, across primates and apes 
(including Homo sapiens), the relative size of 
the neocortex is monotonically related to the 
size of a typical everyday social group—for 
humans, our extra neocortex implies a group 
size of about 150 (Dunbar 1992). 
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More surprisingly, new studies show that 
even within species, differences in brain 
volume in amygdala and cortex are associ-
ated with personal group size (Dunbar 2012; 
Bickart et al. 2011), and with monkey group 
size and dominance ranks (Sallet et al. 2011). 
None of these studies can clearly conclude 
whether brain structure supports large net-
work interaction, or large networks grow 
brains. The crossspecies evidence suggests 
bigger brains subserve bigger networks, but 
general brain plasticity (in response to envi-
ronment) also suggests that causality goes in 
both directions. It would be fascinating to 
examine brain structures and activity in peo-
ple raised in unusually large or small groups 
(for exogeneous reasons) to help establish 
causality.
4. Reviewing Foundations of 
Neuroeconomic Analysis
As noted, the book is apparently not 
intended to be a comprehensive discussion of 
all of the methods and discoveries in neuro-
economics, as a handbook or textbook would 
strive to be. Instead, it is one part philosophy 
of knowledge, one part history of neurosci-
ence, one part personal vision of a field, and 
one part NYU promotional brochure.
From the point of view of economists, the 
book’s coverage and tone reflect two method-
ological convictions: first, that simple axiom-
atic systems which summarize the empirical 
implications (i.e., what axioms must be satis-
fied) of a class of functional representations 
should be central objects of study in neuro-
economics, and second, that neuroeconom-
ics can most productively start by exploring 
whether neural circuitry implements simple 
rational choice.
4.1 How Useful are Axioms? 
The view that axiomatic models will 
prove especially helpful in neuroeconomics 
is heavily promoted in Glimcher’s book.2 
Axiomatic systems summarize all the empiri-
cal choice restrictions a general class of mod-
els should satisfy, without typically specifying 
too precise a functional form. For example, 
expected utility theory axioms allow the util-
ity function to have any shape, but require 
valuations to be sums of outcome utilities 
weighted linearly by their probabilities. If 
the independence axiom is systematically 
violated, then choices are not described by 
expected utilities. 
The simplest example of how axiomatics 
could work in neuroscience is reward pre-
diction error (RPE). RPE is the difference 
between a received reward and an expecta-
tion (an economic “surprise”). RPEs occur 
during learning, and mathematical adjust-
ment to RPE can lead to good long-run learn-
ing properties (e.g., Sutton and Barto 1998). 
RPEs have generally been measured as 
linear deviations between reward and expec-
tations. Caplin et al. (2010) took a step back 
and suggested axioms defining a more gen-
eral RPE structure. Define an RPE for out-
come x and expectation (or reference point) 
r as δ(x, r). An axiomatic definition of an 
RPE is a function δ(x, r) which is increas-
ing in x, decreasing in r, and which satisfies 
δ(x, r) = 0 when x = r (i.e., the prediction 
error is zero when x is expected and received, 
regardless of the amount of reward x). 
Many previous studies found evidence for 
RPE encoding based on a linear restriction 
δ(x, r) = x − r, where r(t) is an expectation or 
reference point that is tracked by reward his-
tory (typically with a decay or learning rate). 
Caplin et al. (2010) cite these previous 
findings of linear RPE and conclude that 
“although generally supportive, these tests 
have all failed to be taken as conclusive 
proof of the DRPE hypothesis by assuming 
fixed values for the ‘experienced reward’ of 
2 See also Caplin and Dean (2008), and Dean (2013).
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different events and using a reinforcement 
learning model to construct a time path for 
‘predicted reward’” (p. 927). Basically, their 
planned contribution is to find RPE signals 
with a less parametric linear restriction.
However, their own analysis assumes fixed 
(cross-trial) values for experienced reward 
(by binning them according to equal out-
comes) and assumes a fixed predicted reward 
based on stated probabilities, rather than 
predictions adjusted along a time path. Thus, 
even though their axiomatic system is more 
general, in principle, than the linear version, 
in execution it makes strong assumptions 
that reward expectation is constant. 
The main point here is that both earlier 
analyses and their analysis must assume some 
auxiliary hypothesis about stability of reward 
values across trials, and some source of pre-
dictions. Why is one maintained hypothesis, 
then, more “conclusive proof” than another? 
The key difference is simply that the Caplin 
et al. (2010) analysis requires monotonic-
ity but allows nonlinearity in the response 
to reward and prediction, and allows cross-
partial effects of reward outcome on predic-
tion. However, given that linearity is almost 
always an excellent approximation to a non-
linear monotonic function, this is a conceptu-
ally important distinction but not a practically 
important one.3 It is an incarnation of non-
parametric versus parametric testing in which 
a parametric restriction is quite reasonable. 
Figure 1 shows the BOLD signal from 
Rutledge et al. (2010), with reward predic-
tion on the x-axis. Figure 2 shows a com-
parable graph from Abler, who identified 
ROIs using an imposed linear contrast 
δ(x, r) = x − r = x – px. The Abler figures 
show strong support for the three general 
properties of DRPE axiomatically  identified 
by Caplin and Dean: signals respond 
3 Abler et al. (2006) also tried a quadratic term using 
reward prediction error (RPE) but had no extra success, as 
the linear approximation fit well.
 positively to reward, negatively to prediction, 
and the signal for getting either expected 
reward is the same. The only difference is 
that Abler imposes linearity and Caplin et al. 
(2010) allow nonlinearity (and fanning out of 
the two curves). 
So let’s take stock of what the axioms have 
added here. Axioms suggest that the strongest 
test is not what brain areas respond to linear 
δ(x, r) = x − r, but instead what areas indi-
cate positive and negative responses to x and 
r, respectively, with δ(5, 5) = δ(−5, −5) = 0. 
Regions responsive to RPE identified by 
Abler et al. (2006) several years ago appear 
to pass these tests, visually. However, Abler 
et al. did not actually conduct the prescribed 
statistical tests; they impose linearized ver-
sions. So they got the right answer, but with-
out statistical proof. Put differently, in this 
case the axioms point to more general tests 
about the shapes of BOLD response, but 
the linearized results are so compelling the 
contribution is not an empirical surprise, but 
instead is a useful methodological sugges-
tion about how to do more careful statistical 
testing.4 
Caplin et al. (2010) conclude that, “our 
work rigorously tests and confirms the 
conclusions of previous authors who have 
claimed to have found evidence in favor of 
the DRPE hypothesis in fMRI data.” I agree 
that there is an added dimension of “rigor” 
from statistical testing of more general func-
tional forms (response to x and r rather than 
linear response to x − r), but there is not a 
big leap in knowledge.
Furthermore, there are other neuromet-
ric dimensions of rigor and confirmation 
strength. For example, as Caplin et al. (2010) 
note, there are relatively few dopaminer-
gic neurons in the brain (c. 105). Focusing 
on nucleus accumbens, which is known 
4 Rutledge et al. (2010) uses the same data as Caplin 
et al. (2010) but explores the statistical testing of compari-
sons in multiple regions in a more thorough, powerful way.
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to receive a large density of DA neurons, 
is then a reasonable choice. An even more 
conclusive approach, in one respect, is to 
record BOLD from areas that are known 
from single-unit electrode-based record-
ings to have an especially high density of DA 
neurons. Following this strategy, D’Ardenne 
et al. (2008) recorded BOLD from the small 
midbrain ventral tegmental area (VTA). The 
VTA was the original locus of recording by 
that ignited empirical study of prediction 
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Figure 1. BOLD Activity in Response to Actually Winning or Losing $5,  
Depending on the Probablility of Winning
Notes: Reward prediction errors should decline monotonically from left to right, be higher for wins ($5) than 
losses (–$5) fixing probability, and the response to losing for sure (left point for –$5) should be the same as 
winning for sure (right point for $5). All these properties hold statistically.
Sources: Caplin et al. (2010). Reprinted with permission of the Journal of Neurophysiology.
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The VTA is small (only 2 voxels of typical 
3 x 3 x 3 mm size) so they use a thinner slice 
and some improvements in methods—a dif-
ferent kind of rigor—to improve data quality. 
They find coarse evidence for DRPE in an 
area thought to be richer in DA neurons than 
NAcc (figure 3) Their data quality do not 
permit a statistically powerful test of the gen-
eral Caplin et al. (2010) axioms. However, 
they have the advantage of finding evidence 
more tightly linked to where DA is actually 
transmitted.
Stepping back, how useful are axioms 
in neuroeconomics, and in general? First 
note that axioms can illuminate and clarify 
a good idea, but some good ideas also shine 
on their own. In economics, for a long time 
there was no axiomatic (epistemic) basis 
for Nash  equilibrium (until Aumann and 
Brandenburger 1995). Informational effi-
ciency of stock prices, a hypothesis which 
drove empirical finance for decades starting 
in 1965 with Gene Fama’s dissertation, did 
not have clear formal basis until Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980) showed, ironically, that 
full efficiency was implausible (if informa-
tion is costly to gather). Gilboa et al. (2013) 
point out other examples. 
It is notable that historically, important 
advances in axiomatization of choice models 
often come after empirical inspiration. This 
was certainly the case with Glimcher et al.’s 
work on RPE. It is also true in axiomatic work 
on preferences on menus, as illustrated by 
the many experimental examples described 
by Lipman and Pesendorfer (2013), which 
Figure 2. Bottom panel shows linear contrast of prediction error depending on known reward probability 
(x-axis) and actual outcome (light = win, dark = loss). 
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motivated axiomatics. Axiomatic systems 
are perhaps most useful at a middle stage 
of the data-theory-data cycle, showing the 
underlying ingredients are necessary and 
sufficient to account for a phenomenon, 
once the phenomenon is established. In this 
view, neural data might serve as inspiration 
for later modeling (Spiegler 2008). It could 
be that axiomatization will follow neural 
evidence, rather than lead it (as in the RPE 
case). 
The alternative to an axiomatic or non-
parametric approach is a workmanlike tin-
kering approach in which surprising effects 
are first generated (often absent any model 
at all), then parametric specifications are 
proposed and compared, and constant 
modification improves the models.5 Along 
5  In tests of dopaminergic activity as encoding RPE, 
Caplin and Dean (2008, p. 26–27) note four potential 
these lines, Gilboa et al. (2013) propose a 
formal interpretation of axiomatic mod-
els as analogies. They note (p. 17) that an 
axiomatization cannot make a theory more 
true or false. Instead, “axiomatizations (in 
this case, of utility maximization) point 
out to us similarities that are not obvious a 
priori.”
problems with nonaxiomatic parametric tests: 1) Tests 
require a joint hypothesis about RPE and rewards, beliefs 
and observables (but axiomatic tests do too); 2) parametric 
tests of one theory do not reject another poorly-specified 
theory (axiomatic tests don’t either); 3) parametric tests 
may lack power to distinguish different functions (but gen-
eral axioms have no distinguishing power at all by construc-
tion, and if distinction is sought it could be achieved, e.g., 
Hare et al. 2008); and 4) comparative “horse race” tests of 
specific theories do not give information about goodness-
of-fit (that’s wrong; they do). Thus, there is no special guar-
antee that tests of axioms are necessarily more conclusive 


























Figure 3. BOLD Response in Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA), Fine-Grained Imaging, in Response to 
Unexpected Reward Surprises
Notes: Results are not as strong in Caplin et al. (2010) and Abler et al. (2006), but image smaller regions of 
VTA known to be rich in dopamine receptors.
Source: D’Ardenne et al. (2008). Reprinted with permission of Science.
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Whether axioms or tinkering are bet-
ter has something to do with scientific risk 
tastes. The axiomatic approach is safer, 
because choices will satisfy the axioms if any 
specific function within the class is correct. 
Conversely, if the axioms are clearly rejected, 
that could be bad news (less so in the anal-
ogy interpretation). While the rejections 
may offer guidance about how to weaken 
axioms, there may be a natural tendency to 
either object to the evidence or postpone for 
a long time the much harder work of find-
ing weaker systems with plausible testable 
implications (as happened for many years 
after initial reports of the Allais and Ellsberg 
paradoxes).6
The tinkering approach is a bolder strat-
egy, since a more specific functional form is 
more likely to be rejected. However, if a spe-
cific functional form passes strong tests, that 
is very good news.  And a strong advantage 
of working with a specific functional form is 
that more precise predictions can be made 
about how much choices respond to changes, 
not simply the likely sign of a response.
With this example in mind, it is now useful 
to reflect on how promising axiomatic sys-
tems might prove to be in general. 
Axiomatic systems are certainly useful in 
consolidating advancement of economic 
knowledge. However, the reliance on axi-
omatic systems to tie observable choice data 
to revelation unobservables is also the heart 
of the Gul–Pesendorfer assertion that non-
choice data are not needed. 
In my view, axiomatic systems are likely to 
have a more limited role in neuroeconomics 
than Glimcher believes. To see why, consider 
how Spiegler (2013) describes the recipe for 
a particular popular axiomatic approach:
6 Note that it took more than 20–30 years after the Allais 
paradoxes were pointed out for prospect theory and other 
formal non-EU systems to emerge. There was a similar lag 
from Ellsberg’s 1961 paper on ambiguity-aversion to axi-
omatic systems.
According to “[David] Krepsian” method-
ology, one starts with an intuition or more 
systematic observations suggesting how 
a certain psychological “force” (ambigu-
ity aversion, anxiety, desire for flexibility) 
might be connected to observed behavior, 
and one looks for a domain of choice objects 
(Anscombe–Aumann acts, temporal lotter-
ies, menus), such that preferences over this 
domain could elicit this force.
The whole point of the modeling exer-
cise is to identify the “force” by its impact 
on choice, without using any direct measure. 
However, the types of choice data needed to 
test these choice-based models get more and 
more complicated as the psychological force 
becomes more interesting. For example, in 
menu-based theories, the data needed are 
whether people choose over a wide variety 
of larger or smaller choice sets. What field 
settings supply these data? 
Whether the original modelers like it or 
not, Krepsian analysis (as Spiegler describes 
it) certainly invites neuroeconomic “direct 
measure” of the hypothesized psychologi-
cal forces because nonexperimental clear 
choices over menus might be rarely avail-
able.  However, many—perhaps most—of 
the theorists working in this tradition seem 
to think the main value of the exercise is to 
avoid having to measure anything other than 
choices. But any particular axiomatic system 
is just one particular way of linking hypoth-
esized forces with axioms and observable 
preferences. It would be an amazing coinci-
dence if the axiomatic systems the Krepsian 
theorists produce happen to coincide with 
how the brain works (unless the axioms are 
proposed with brain knowledge in mind). 
There is hope for such coincidences,7 but 
I predict that the Krepsian program is not 
likely to produce many of them. 
7 A promising example is Fudenberg and Levine (2006), 
who clearly think of their short-run vs. long-run self model 
as having some neural plausibility.
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Finally, it is certainly true that the RPE 
axiomatics is a successful application because 
the axioms tell you clearly what to look for in 
the data . . . and the data are easily available 
from an experiment (possibly even in a field 
setting). 
4.2 What is Most Authoritative and 
Convincing
The core of the book, which is most 
authoritative, is building the empirical case 
for a two-stage model of simple choice: each 
object in a choice set is valued, then the val-
ues are compared and the best one is chosen 
(perhaps with stochastic choice about what’s 
“best”). 
The neural evidence is compelling. Neural 
brain activity of different sorts—neural firing 
rates from single-unit recording, and BOLD 
signal from fMRI—is associated across many 
domains with expressed value ratings (on 
numerical scales) and with utilities inferred 
from decisions. This is an important step 
in showing that there are neutrally-derived 
numbers that correspond to behaviorally-
derived numbers. 
The evidence for a comparison process 
is not as clear. (Choice among four or more 
options, for example, has rarely been studied 
in decision neuroscience, to my knowledge). 
There is much clear evidence of neurons 
implementing an optimal sequential proba-
bilistic likelihood test (Gold and Shadlen 
2007), OFC neurons that fire in response 
to comparative value (Padoa-Schioppa 
and Assad 2006), and cingulate activity in 
response to comparative value (e.g., Hsu 
et al. 2005). 
Utility maximization over two choices 
works well because reinforcement learning 
systems do very well under environmental 
stability with rapid clear feedback.8 This fact 
8 My thesis advisors Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) made 
the important point that when feedback lags are not rapid, 
was anticipated, in a sense, by Pareto who 
specifically thought of stable tastes as result-
ing from a trial-and-error learning process.9  
The extrapolation from this well-docu-
mented process of learned simple valuation 
to more complex lifelike choices will be much 
more challenging. In this sense, Foundations 
documents the current solution to the easi-
est problem, to show economists what part 
of a good neuroeconomic foundation looks 
like, but leaves the bigger challenges for the 
future. 
There are many kinds of evidence and 
nascent theories (some going back decades) 
showing when the simple value-then-com-
pare does not seem to apply, including:
• Choices among several objects with mul-
tiple attributes, in which important attri-
butes are often used to screen out poor 
choices (Tversky 1972);
• A shift from decision rules using more 
information to rules using less infor-
mation as choice complexity increases 
(Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993); 
• Regret theories in which the sign of 
the comparative value of choices A 
and B, ψ(A,B), determines choice (A is 
preferred if ψ(A,B) > 0) (Loomes and 
Sugden 1987). In this theory there is not 
necessarily an initial valuation of choice 
objects separately; 
and are noisy, learning degrades badly. These conditions 
have not been studied in human decision neuroscience.
9 Pareto (1971) wrote: “A man who buys a certain food 
for the first time may buy more of it than is necessary to 
satisfy his tastes, price taken into account. But in a sec-
ond purchase he will correct his error, in part at least, and 
thus, little by little, will end up by procuring exactly what 
he needs. We will examine this action at the time when he 
has reached this state. Similarly, if at first he makes a mis-
take in his reasoning about what he desires, he will rectify 
it in repeating the reasoning and will end up by making it 
completely logical. (Ch. 3, §1)” Bruni and Sugden (2007) 
give a wonderful description of this point and the ongo-
ing debates surrounding it during the rise of neoclassical 
economics.
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• Effects of irrelevant alternatives or 
choice context (also called menu effects) 
on individual valuation or comparison of 
choices (e.g., Soltani, De Martino, and 
Camerer 2012);  
• Choices from lists (Rubinstein and Salant 
2006) and satisficing (Caplin, Dean, and 
Martin 2011) (not all objects are valued). 
5. Highs and Lows in Foundations of 
Neuroeconomic Analysis
5.1 Highlights
Glimcher is a careful and extraordinarily 
clear writer. There are many gems. For 
example, Glimcher notes that “[a]t its incep-
tion WARP defined a minimalist esthetic 
that dominates economics to this day. How 
little can you assume in your model and how 
much can it prove?” (p 57).
This compelling passage also shows why 
(most) psychologists dislike economic mod-
eling—the models have “too little” in them! 
Of course, for economists that is precisely 
the point, and the source of such models’ 
charm and power. 
Range normalization: The simple value-
and-compare model is most vulnerable in 
comparing choices across choice sets. The 
reason is that increases in the range of stim-
ulus attributes lead to local divisive normal-
ization (also called “range adaption”). This 
general phenomenon has been well known 
for about thirty years, in behavioral eco-
nomics in the form of context- (or menu-) 
dependence (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982) 
and was precisely modeled starting in 1992 
for visual cortical neurons (Heeger 1992; 
Carandini, Heeger, and Movshon 1997); 
and see Padoa-Schioppa (2009) for range-
dependent value encoding in OFC. This 
property can clearly violate independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) in choice, 
since an irrelevant (unchosen,  low-value) 
 alternative can change the ranges and 
deform normalized subjective values of 
other choice objects. 
Context-dependent choice has been 
observed in many species besides humans, 
including honeybees, gray jays (Shafir, Waite, 
and Smith 2002) and slime molds (Latty and 
Beekman 2011). The species-generality of 
these effects suggest that if there is a single 
explanation of context effects, it is a low-
level sensory normalization, rather than a 
sophisticated explanation, which does not 
apply to slime molds (e.g., Kamenica 2008). 
Privileging a low-level explanation immedi-
ately invites a careful look at basic neurosci-
ence, in which normalization is common in 
sensory systems and is therefore best under-
stood at low levels. 
There is a deep, important discussion of 
neural normalization in chapter 10, and its 
implications for economics (much based on 
an important paper by Louie, Grattan, and 
Glimcher 2011). The main intuitive point 
they draw out is that as choice sets grow 
larger, normalization means that the (nor-
malized) subjective value of the best and 
nearly-best options will fall. This effect will 
create more choice “errors” (or random-util-
ity-based reversals), lower choice satisfaction 
(if satisfaction if driven by relative compari-
sons), and possibly choice postponement 
(if there is a choice threshold that no single 
choice can reach). 
The book ends with a nice string of fire-
cracker explosions. 
Chapter 14 is wonderful. It organizes 
material around region-by-region evidence 
of how five brain regions are active during 
aspects of subjective valuation. This is meant 
to be the best available answer to “Why care 
about where?” The general answer is that, 
if a region appears to make two different 
computations that were not thought to be 
related in current theory, that finding sug-
gests a need to have a theory linking those 
computations. 
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Chapter 16 collects the formalisms devel-
oped earlier in one place. Economists who 
confuse math-free psychology and compu-
tational neuroscience should read this chap-
ter over and over, and assign it to students. 
It contains much of the formalism that will 
propel decision neuroscience for the next 
10 years. An action-packed picture accom-
panying this grand vision is reproduced in 
figure 4, showing how economic, psycho-
logical, and neuroscientific analyses can be 
linked from high level (behavioral) to low 
level (mechanistic). 
The last chapter, 17, is a perfect ending to 
the book. The chapter poses six unanswered 
questions. Every graduate student or new-
comer to this field should read this list (as 
well as Huettel 2010). A more ambitious list 
could be constructed, but Glimcher’s com-
pact six-point plan gives us plenty to do. 
5.2 Lowlights
There are some things to disagree about 
in the book. The substantive areas undoubt-
edly reflect the author’s idiosyncratic beliefs 
about intellectual contributions, history, and 
directions (chiefly, discussions of prospect 
theory). Some other debatable material, in 
my view as a long-standing contributor to 
the field, reflects a misunderstanding about 
behavioral economics or simply repeats 
criticisms that have been addressed early 
and often. Chapter 15, titled “Beyond 
Neoclassics: Behavioral Neuroeconomics,” is 
weak. It features an intriguing discussion of 
hierarchical “editing” (which deeply under-
cuts extending the value-compare model 
beyond 2-choice sets), but no data. 
 For example, Glimcher writes that 
“Kahneman and Tversky provided almost 
no information about how the reference 
point was to be determined . . . .” Actually, 
Kahneman and Tversky wrote:
An essential feature of the present theory 
is that the carriers of value are changes in 
wealth or welfare, rather than final states. 
This assumption is compatible with basic prin-
ciples of perception and judgment. Our per-
ceptual apparatus is attuned to the evaluation 
of changes or differences rather than to the 
evaluation of absolute magnitudes. When we 
respond to attributes such as brightness, loud-
ness, or temperature, the past and present con-
text of experience defines an adaptation level, 
or reference point, and stimuli are perceived in 
relation to this reference point. Thus, an object 
at a given temperature may be experienced as 
hot or cold to the touch depending on the tem-
perature to which one has adapted. The same 
principle applies to non-sensory attributes 
such as health, prestige, and wealth. The same 
level of wealth, for example, may imply abject 
poverty for one person and great riches for 
another—depending on their current assets. 
(p 277)
Thus, Kahneman and Tversky clearly state 
that the reference point is “the past and pres-
ent context of experience” and give examples 
of what that means. It’s true they do not pro-
vide “information” (i.e., data), but there is 
plenty of inspiration. 
Glimcher (p. 294) lauds the step forward 
by Koszegi and Rabin (2006), who focus on 
“recent expectations” about likely outcomes 
as reference points. However, Kahneman 
and Tversky clearly anticipated this insight, 
noting that the status quo is not always the 
natural reference point. They wrote: 
Although this is probably true for most choice 
problems, there are situations in which gains 
and losses are coded relative to an expectation 
or aspiration level that differs from the status 
quo. For example, an unexpected tax with-
drawal from a monthly pay check is experi-
enced as a loss, not as a reduced gain. Similarly, 
an entrepreneur who is weathering a slump 
with greater success than his competitors may 
interpret a small loss as a gain, relative to the 
larger loss he had reason to expect. (p 286) 
This Kahneman and Tversky passage 
clearly shined a flashlight in the direc-
tion of expectations rather than status quo. 
(Kahneman 1992 also wrote about mixtures 
of reference points in a largely-overlooked 
paper that is insightful). 





















































Figure 4. Schematic Showing Correspondence of Economic (Behavioral),  
Psychological, and Neuroscientific Concepts
Source: Glimcher (2011).  Figure courtesy of the author.
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Glimcher goes further in making bold 
claims: “What we can see from this neuroeco-
nomic analysis, however, is that these local 
irrationalities [reference-dependencies] arise 
because evolution is trading off the costs of 
accurate sensory encoding against the costs 
of irrational decision making.” 
Of course, the neuroeconomics per se does 
not show any clear evidence of an evolutionary 
tradeoff. Proving that evolutionary selection 
led to a particular kind of neural architecture 
for tradeoff is extraordinarily difficult. The 
evidence just shows that relative coding is 
pervasive and absolute coding is not. There 
is no evidence from the neuroscience, per 
se, that the degree of reference- dependence 
seen in modern human experiments is a clear 
product of an evolutionary tradeoff. I think 
that hypothesis is likely to be true in many 
respects, but it has not been tested directly; 
doing so is an exciting (and difficult) challenge 
for future work. 
Glimcher gets a little carried away in some 
other passages (as enthusiastic authors can 
do). He says that normalization “may provide 
the central tool for fully cardinalizing utility” 
(p. 241, fn 10). He also thinks “the baseline 
level of activation measured by the scan-
ner—the unique zero point—is the physi-
cal instantiation of the reference point…this 
finding also provides us with an empirical 
tool for rendering the [expectational] refer-
ence point directly observable” (p. 354). 
5.3 Oops: Style and Curious Emphases 
There are some notable stylistic features 
of the choice of what material to emphasize 
that I found strange or objectionable. These 
choices are a book writer’s prerogative; and 
reacting to them is also a reader’s prerogative. 
First: The title!? The name is presum-
ably an homage to Samuelson’s aptly-named 
Foundations of Economic Analysis. Naming 
a book after such a seminal classic invites a 
comparison that an author should not want 
readers to make. The homage title also misses 
the essence of Samuelson’s book, which is a 
pathbreaking mathematical analysis of eco-
nomic systems, not just a useful model of 
individual behavior.
The book is also packed with the loudest 
cheers when the home team (NYU) scores. 
Remember the famous 1976 Saul Steinberg 
“New Yorker” cover? It depicted a dis-
torted map looking west from 9th avenue 
in Manhattan. The cartoon showed detailed 
pedestrians, buildings and cars from the East 
River up to 10th avenue, then a thin strip of 
“Jersey” past the wide Hudson River, and a 
modest patch representing the entire rest of 
the United States. 
This book is akin to a Saul Steinberg car-
toon from a NYU-roeconomic perspective. 
Some of the pro–NYU attention is justi-
fied, but the emphasis is heavy and uneven. 
Besides Glimcher’s own work, the work and 
collaborations with Andrew Caplin (NYU) 
get special attention and explanation, as does 
an influential mathematical normalization 
of visual cortex responses proposed David 
Heeger (1992). A normalization of neu-
ral inputs due to Schwartz and Simoncelli 
(2001) (one of several in the literature) is ush-
ered onstage as the “Schwartz–Simoncelli” 
equation.  
However, other local NYU contributions 
to neuroeconomics are surprisingly absent. 
NYU cognitive neuroscientist Elizabeth 
Phelps collaborated with NYU economist 
Andrew Schotter and others (Delgado et 
al. 2008) to show how fMRI activity during 
overbidding in auctions suggested a kind of 
endowment effect from “losing” an auction 
one was expecting to win. The neural evi-
dence suggested a novel prediction about 
how economically identical auctions would 
lead to different bids, a prediction they 
confirmed. Using neural evidence to pre-
dict novel, surprising institutional effects is 
something economists are keenly interested 
in, so it is unfortunate that was not discussed 
at all in the book. 
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Contributions of other neuroeconomists 
outside of Manhattan below 14th Street 
are also omitted. Greg Berns, Giorgio 
Coricelli, Mauricio Delgado, Ernst Fehr, 
Kevin McCabe, Aldo Rustichini, and Paul 
Zak might be disappointed to see their 
names missing entirely. Ray Dolan, Read 
Montague, and Sam McClure are cited 
once each. Among past presidents of the 
Society for Neuroeconomics (excluding 
Paul Glimcher, his former postdoc Michael 
Platt, and Manhattanites), there are no 
citations at all of work by Peter Bossaerts, 
Hauke Heekeren, and Scott Huettel, two 
for myself, and five for Antonio Rangel. 
Meanwhile, Oskar Morgenstern is cited six 
times, and neuroskeptic Faruk Gul is cited 
nine times. 
There is a lot of Nobel-associated name 
checking. Readers are pointed toward 
Nobel Laureate Selten’s (1975) paper on 
trembling-hand perfection for an “excellent 
description” of random utility stochasticity 
as a series of choice errors. (Selten’s main 
idea, actually, was to use the device of (van-
ishing) errors to allow Bayesian updating 
at non-equilibrium nodes, not especially to 
introduce stochastic choice or even to model 
choice error in a biologically plausible way.) 
We are also told that Nobel Laureate Dan 
McFadden (1974) developed probabilistic 
choice modeling after being “struck by this 
logic, and how it differed from signal detec-
tion theory.” Actually, he cites Thurstone 
(1927) on psychophysical error and has 
nothing to say about signal detection (see 
McFadden 2001). 
Some of the history and descriptions of 
behavioral economics developments are just 
wrong or curiously reconstructed. Glimcher 
traces a path from responding to the (Nobel 
Laureate) Allais paradox by abandoning the 
mathematical-axiomatic approach in favor 
of the “contemporary ‘heuristics and biases’ 
approach” (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 
1974; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). 
That’s not how it happened (see Kahneman 
and Tversky 1982). 
He says that Kahneman and Tversky got 
reference dependence by “borrowing from 
earlier neoclassical writers” (p. 287). But 
Markowitz (1952)  is the only one Kahneman 
and Tversky cited in their seminal 1979 
paper, and they noted other empirical stud-
ies showing reflection of gain-loss risk atti-
tudes, but not from neoclassicals. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) further clarify that 
their inspiration came largely from figure-
ground perceptual switches familiar from 
visual cognitive science, not from a small 
branch of neoclassical thinking. 
Glimcher also “hastens to point out that 
many features of the ‘Asian disease problem’ 
[which demonstrates reflection effects] have 
limited its impact in economic circles,” alleg-
edly because it is artificial (“make-believe”), 
low-stakes, possibly conveys information, 
and is perhaps confusing. All these nuisance 
critiques have been ruled out many times 
early (and late, too) in the history of behav-
ioral economics experiments. Furthermore, 
Laibson and Zeckhauser (1998, table 2) show 
from citations that the framing examples 
in their 1981 paper, and later papers using 
the same ideas, actually did have substantial 
impact in top economics journals.  
A description of how endowment affects 
how experiments are run is a pastiche of 
the methods that have actually been used 
(pp. 105–06), like a Hollywood screen writ-
er’s “composite character.” We are also told 
(p. 384) that Hertwig et al. (2004) estimated 
a probability weighting function. They did 
not. 
The sourcing is missing or sketchy in 
important passages about how psychology 
and economic theory have interacted his-
torically. Incomplete sourcing can especially 
distract people in a rapidly-emerging inter-
disciplinary field for two reasons: fevered 
criticism may be quickly refuted (or may 
have been refuted already, but is unknown 
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to critics); and paying attention to the most 
shrill critics can lead to tyranny of a vocal 
minority.  Here are two examples, of the sort 
that a New Yorker-quality fact checker would 
have noted:
• “…before Allais’ paradox was discovered, 
there was an almost universal convic-
tion that axioms rooted in expected util-
ity theory would successfully describe 
human choice behavior.” 
• “…a group of psychologists and neurobi-
ologists have argued that even the phrase 
‘neuroeconomics’ is distasteful because 
of its obvious ties to what Carlyle (1849) 
called ‘the dismal science.’ ” 
6. Conclusion
 Paul Glimcher’s book makes a strong, 
coherent, empirical argument for the poten-
tial of neural measures of subjective value 
to match up to, and potentially inform, the 
simplest economic concepts and questions. 
His approach is patient and conservative, in 
the sense that he adheres to a style—rooted 
in rational choice, moving cautiously, and 
endorsing axiomatic systems as a method to 
efficiently test families of potential behav-
ioral functional forms—which economists 
will be most comfortable with. I prefer to 
rush ahead using what is known from a few 
decades of behavioral economics to begin 
looking for neural circuits that adjudicate 
between rational and behavioral models 
(often alternative models, which prolifer-
ate quickly since economists are so good at 
theorizing from sparse data) or which break 
new ground. Happily, these slow and fast 
approaches can both be pursued in parallel, 
and they are. 
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